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A 48 item reasoning test was administered to 210 
teenage subjects. On the basis of their educational status, 
the subjects were classified into three groups: fourth formers, 
sixth formers and university students. There were 70 subjects 
in each group with equal numbers of males and females. The 
mean ages of these three groups were 14.95, 17.16 and 18.96 
years respectively. 
The reasoning test assessed the subjects' ability 
to master deductive arguments on four basic principles of 
conditional and disjunctive reasoning with both concrete 
and abstract content. The data were analysed using.parametric 
analysis of variance and certain non-parametric statistics. 
The latter form of analysis was carried out as a check on 
the parametric analysis of variance results. This was done 
because the normality as~umptions of the parametric analysis 
of variance were not completely fulfilled. The results of 
the non-parametric analyses were highly similar to those 
of the parametric analysis of variance. 
The results indicate that mastery of the four principles 
of deductive logic improves with age. Further, the results 
indicate no difference between the two sexes relative to 
their performance on the reasoning test. The results also 
indicate that subjects find no difference in difficulty 
between items within the concrete and the abstract content. 
The results also show that there are differences between 
subjects' mastery of the detachment principle and the three 
principles of contraposition, conversion and inversion in 
conditional reasoning. In contrast, there is no difference 
between subjects' mastery of the four principles in disjunctive 
reasoning. The results also show that subjects find items 
within disjunctive reasoning easier to master than items 
within conditional reasoning. Generally, the results obtained 
are comparable to the findings of previous studies of teenagers' 
ability to master deductive arguments. Finally, several 




Broadly defined, propositional logic is the logic 
of all systems that satisfy three conditions: 
(i) There are two or more factors (variables); 
2 
(ii) Each factor can take on two discrete values; and 
(iii) All combinations of these factors take on the same 
two valu~s. 
It is crucial that the values be mutually exclusive and 
not overlap in any way. In principle, propositional logic 
deals with systems in which there are any number of variables 
and any .number of mutually exclusive values. But the simplest 
possible example of propositional logic, the example which 
we shall consider, consists of two variables and two values. 
By convention, the variables are called propositional functions 
and are denoted by "p" and "q". The two values may be 
just about anything, but they are usually called true and 
false to emphasize their mutual exclusiveness. 
Suppose we let our first propositional function, 
p, be "x invented the telephone" and we let our second 
propositional function, q, be "x was President of the United 
States". When a specific person is substituted for the 
x in either statement, the statement becomes either true 
or false. For example, pis true if Graham Bell is substi-
tuted but is false if Aristotle is substituted. Similarly 
q is true if Lincoln is substituted but is false if Caesar 
is substituted. The substitution of a specific person 
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for the x in either statement is called interpretation. 
When a propositional function is interpreted and becomes 
true or false, it is called a proposition. This is where 
the "propositional" in propositional logic comes from. 
Through the process of interpretation, p and q each 
becomes true or false. Consequently, there are four possible 
results of interpreting both statements: 
(i) p = true and q = true (e.g. Graham Bell invented 





p = false and q true (e.g. Aristotle invented 
the telephone and Lincoln was the President 
of the United States); 
p = true and q = false (e.g. Graham Bell invented 
the telephone and Caesar was President of the 
United States); and 
p = false and q = false (e.g. Aristotle invented 
the telephone and Caesar was President of the 
United States). 
Since there are exactly four possible outcomes of interpreting 
p and q, we may think of p and q as forming a new compound 
propositional function which we denote by p + q. The com-
pound proposition p + q takes on exactly four interpretations 
which correspond to four possible outcomes of interpreting 
p and q. Since all proposit,ional functions in our system 
must be either true or false once they are interpreted, 
p + q must be either true or false when it is assigned 
one of its four interpretations. Suppose we assign p + q 
one of its four interpretations one after the other. It 
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follows, there are 4 2 or 16 possible true-false outcomes. 
At one extreme, it might be that p + q turns out to be true 
for all the four interpretations. At the other extreme, 
it might be that p + q turns out to be false for all 
the four interpretations. In between, there are fourteen 
other outcomes where p + q is true for some interpretations 
and false for others. These sixteen possible outcomes, 
along with the names that are usually given to them 
in propositional logic, are shown in Table 1. 
Propositional logic is generally taken to be 
one kind of deductive logic, as in the following example: 
Premises 
(i) If the car is black, then it is a police car 
(ii) The car is black . 
Conclusion 
(iii) It is a police car. 
This argument is "valid" because the conclusion follows 
necessarily from the premises. An invalid argument is one in 
which the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the 
premises, as in the example below. 
Premises 
(i) If the car is black, then it is a police car 
(ii) It is a police car. 
Erroneous Conclusion 
(iii) The car is blac~. 
Obviously there could be a police car which is not black. 
The relations between propositions are described by a 
set of symbols, the main symbols being shown in Table 2. 
Table 1: The sixteen outcomes from combining two binary operations 
COMPONENT PROPOSITIONS 
OUTCOME p = true p = true p = false p = false CONSTRUCTED COMBINATION 
q = true q = false q = true q = false 
- - - -1. Affirmation (p*q) t t t t p•q V p•q V p•q V p•q 
- -
2. Disjunction (p V q) t t t f p•q V p•q V p•q 
3. Reverse Conditiona1
1
(p+-q) - - -t t f t p•q V p•q V p•q 
- - -
4. Conditional (p+q) t f t t p•q V p•q V p•q 
- - - -5. Nonconjunction (p/q) f t t t p•q V p•q V p•q 
-
6. Affirmation of p(p) t t f f p•q V p•q 
-
7. Affirmation of q(q) t f t f p•q V p•q 
- -
8. Equivalence (p = q) t f f t p•q V p•q 
- - -
9. Denial of q -(q) f t f t p•q y p•q 
- - -10. Denial of p -(p) f f t t p~q V p•q 
- -11. Nonequivalence -(p q) .,:: t t f p•q V p•q .L 
- -
12. Conjunction (p•q) t f f f p•q 
13. Nonconditional -(p+q) f -f t f p•q 
-
14. Nonreverse Conditional -(p+q) f f t f p•q 
- -
15. Nondisjunction -(p v q) f f f t p•q 
16. Negation -(p*q) f f f f 0 
1 Since conditional statements assert a contingent relationship between two things, they are also referred 
to as statements of implication. 
l]1 











if ... then (conditional) 
The (-) symbol refers to the fact that each and every 
proposition can be negated. If, for example, we have the 
proposition "The car is black" (symbolised by p), the negation 
of the proposition is "The car is not black" (symbolised by 
p not p). 
The symbols (•) and (v) are forms of simple addition 
and multiplication respectively. Consider the case in which 
we have another proposition '!The car is a police car" (q). 
The addition or conjunction, of the two propositions becomes 
p•q and means "The car is black and the car is a police car." 
The multiplication of the two propositions produces p v q 
which means "Either the car is black or the car is a police 
car (or both)". 
The final symbol describes the conditional relationsh~p 
p+q, which means that if pis true, then q is true, or in 
terms of the above propositions "If the car is black, then it 
is a police car". 
Propositional logic is ordinarily concerned with the 
validity of arguments utilising propositions standing alone or 
under the influence of one or more of these logical operators. 
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As propositional logic is central in human reasoning, 
there are reasons for wanting to know when children are capa-
ble of using and understanding them. Most of these reasons 
are educational. Mathematics and science comprise a major 
portion of the present day school curriculum. If we wish to 
teach mathematics and science in such a way that pupils under-
stand the relevant concepts rather than merely learning them 
by rote, it is necessary to acquaint them with the forms of 
logical reasoning on which these concepts are based. If we 
then decide to teach such logical operations, we need to know 
when children are capable of understanding them. 
There is a long history of research on the development 
of propositional resasoning dating back to the origins of the 
intelligence testing movement at the turn of the century. How-
ever, our interest is in a series of investigations dating from 
the early 1960's, inspired by Piaget's (1958) claim that 
" ... the child at the concrete level (Stage II: from 7-8 to 
11-12 years) cannot yet handle" propositional logic ( Inhelder 
and Piaget, 1958; p.l). The starting point for this series 
of studies was a doctoral dissertation by Hill (1961). 
Hill (1961) found that children (agep 6-8) were able 
to recognise valid conclusions derived from hypothetical 
premises of the following forms: 
Example 1: Sentential Logic 
If this is Room 9, then it is fourth grade. 
This is Room 9. 
Is it fourth grade? 
a. Yes b. No 
Example 2: Classical Syllogism 
All of Ted's pets have four legs. 
No birds have four legs. 
Does Ted have a bird for a pet? 
a. Yes b. No 
Example 3: Logic of quantification 
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None of the pictures was painted by anyone I know. 
I know Hank's sister. 
Did she paint one of the pictures? 
a. Yes b. No 
All items consisted of two premises, a question and two pos-
sible responses, "Yes" and "No". In addition, Hill reported 
steady increases with age for these three types of logic, 
with sentential logic being easier than quantificational 
logic at age 6, a difference which disappeared by age 8. 
Suppes (1965), commenting on these results, argued 
that they provided evidence" ... contrary to that given 
by Piaget and Inhelder in that children of age 6,7 and 8 
are able to deal very effectively with verbal premises 
that call for hypothetical reasoning and are by no means 
limited to 'concrete' operations". 
O'Brien and Shapiro (1968) extended Hill's research 
by evaluating children's (ages 6-8) ability to recognise 
principles for which no valid conclusion was possible. 
In their study, two measuring instruments were used. Test 
A was the same test as in the Hill study; and Test B was 
the same as Test A except that (i) 33 of the original 100 
items were "opened up" so that no necessary conclusion 
followed from the premises, and (ii) for every item in 
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Test B, a "Not enough clues" option was added to the "Yes" 
and "No" response choices provided in Test A. "Opened 
up" Test B items might be: 
Example 1: Sentential Logic 
If this is Room 9, then it is fourth grade. 
This is not Room 9. 
Is it fourth grade? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not enough clues 
Example 2: Classical syllogism. 
Some of Ted's pets have four legs. 
No birds have four legs. 
Does Ted have a bird for a pet? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not enough clues 
Example 3: Logic of quantification 
Some of the pictures were painted by people I know. 
I know Hank's sister. 
Did she paint one of the pict'ures? 
a. Yes b. No c. Not enough clues 
As in the Hill study, the children had considerable success 
in recognising valid conclusions in the three types of 
logic. But they experienced great difficulty in recognising 
invalid conclusions in each type of logic and showed slow 
growth in this ability. 
Donaldson (1963) conducted longitudinal studies 
with students 10-12 and 12-14 years of age. She presented 
these students with three verbal problems in class logic 
involving syllogisms and found that their ability to infer 
10 
valid conclusions increased with age. They showed no 
improvement, however, in the ability to recognise invalid 
patterns of inference. 
Ennis and Paulus (1965) discovered large differences 
in raw scores, difficulty indices, and percentages of mastery 
for specific principles of class and conditional reasoning 
at given grade levels (4-12). They reported that the greatest 
improvement in the mastery of specific principles, as children 
grew older, was that for the invalid principles. 
While the findings of these investigations are 
valuable, they are restricted in scope for one or more 




Only one type of reasoning was tested; 
Only valid principles were tested; 
The principles tested in the different types 
of reasoning were dissimilar in terms of 
logical structure; and 
(iv) The tests for each type of reasoning were 
not administered to the same students. 
In trying to overcome these limitations, a number of 
researchers (e.g. Brainerd, 1976-1977; Ennis, 1976, 1978; 
Roberge, 1970) have been particularly concerned with 
standardising the elementary principles of deductive 
logic before administering them. Amongst these researchers, 
the work of Ennis has been the most extensive. In Table 
3, the standard elementary principles of deductive logic 
are presented (adapted from Ennis, 1976). Part A of 
the table, 11 Formally Valid Moves" guarantees a valid 
argument {i.e., an argument in which the conclusion 
follows necessarily from the premises). In the "Formally 
RJi.#f¥UliC. ,Q._7_.J@..A I\) I E.F.>(i *ifWJll("h Oil 
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I. Detachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If p, then q. • 
p. ___ b 
q. 
2. Particular transitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If p; then q. 
3. Full transitivity ........................ 
4. Particular contraposition ................ 
If q, then r. 
p. 
r. 
If p, then q. 
If q, then r. 
---
If p, then r. 






(For all x) 
if x is an A, 
then x is a B. • 
n is an A.• 
n is a B. 
(For all .r) 
if x is an A, 
then x is a B. 
(For all .r) 
ifxisaB, 
then x is a C. 
nisanA. 
n is a C. 
(For all :c) 
if :c is an A, 
then :c is a B. 
(For all :c) 
ifx is aB, 
then x is a C. 
---
(For all x) 
if x is an A, 
then x is a C. 
(For all x) 
if x is an A, 
then x is a B. 
n is not a B. 
---





A. Formally Valid Moves 
All A's are B's. 
n is an A. 
n is a B. 
All A's are B's. 
All B's are C's. 
n is an A. 
n is a C. 
All A's are B's. 
All B's are C's. 
---
All A's are C's. 
All A's are B's. 
n is not a B. 
---
n is not an A. 
Either p or q.' 
Not p. 
q. 
Either p or q. 
Either not q or r. 
Notp. 
r. 
Either p or q. 
Either not q or r. 
---
Either p or r. 






(For all x) either :c 
is an A or x is a B.' 
n is not an A. 
n is a B. 
(For all .r) either .r 
is an A or:c is a B. 
(For all .r) either :c 
is not a B or 
:c IS a C. 
n is not an A. 
n is a C. 
(For all :c) either :c 
is an A or :c is a B. 
(For all .r) 
either x 
is not a B or x 
is a C. 
--
(For all x) either x 
is an A or x 
is a C. 
(For all x) 
either x 
is an A or :c is a B. 
n is not a B. 
-
n is an A. 
I-' 
I-' 
5. Full contraposition ..................... 
6. Biconditionality: d 
a) Forward positive detachment .......... 
b) Reverse positive detachment ........... 
c) Forward negative detachment ......... 
d) Reverse negative detachment .......... 











A. Formally 'Valid Moves 
If p, then q. (For all x) 
--- if x is an A, 
If not q, then then x is a B. 
not p. ---
(For all x) if 
x is not a B, then 
x is not an A. 
p if and only (For all x) x is an A 
if q. if and only if x 
p. is a B. 
n is an A. 
q. ---
n is a B. 
p if and only (For all x) x is an A 
if q. if and only if x 
q. is a B. 
--- n is a B. 
p. ---
n is an A. 
p if and only (For all x) x is an A 
if q. if and only if x 
is a B. 
Notp. n is not an A. 
--- ---
Not q. n is not a B. 
p if and only (For all x) x is an A 
if q. if and only if x 
Not q. is a B. 
--- n is not a B. 
Not p. ---
n is not an A. 
All A's are B's. 
---
All non-B's are 
non-A's. 
All and only A's 
are B's. 
n is an A. 
---
n is a B. 
All and only A's 
are B's. 
n is a B. 
---
n is an A. 
All and only A's 
are B's. 
n is not an A. 
---
n is not a B. 
All and only A '.s 
are B's. 
n is not a B. 
---
n is not an A. 
Either p or q. 
---
Either q or p. 




















(For all x) either x 
is an A or x is a B. 
(For all x) either :r 
is a B or x is an A. 
(For all x) :r 
is anA orx is aB, 
but not both. 
n is not an A. 
n is a B. 
(For all x) x 
is an A orx is aB, 
but not both. 
n is not a B. 
n is an A. 
(For all x) :r is an 
A or x is a B 
but not both. 
n is an A. 
n is not a B 
(For all x) :r is an 
A or :r is a B, 
bur not both . 
11 u a 8 ... --4 
>--' 
I\.) 
7. Particular conversion .................. . 
8. Full conversion ....................... . 
9. Particular inversion .................... . 
10. Full inversion ........................ . 
If p, then q. 
q. 
p. 
If p, then q. 
If q, then p. 
If p, then q. 
Not p. 
Not q. 
If p, then q. 
If not P, 
then not q. 
(For all :r) 
if :r is an A, 
then :r is a B. 
n is a B. 
n is an A. 
(For all-:r) 
if :r is an A, 
then :r is a B. 
(For all :r) 
if :r is a B, 
then :r is an A. 
(For all :r) 
if :r is an A, 
then :r is a B. 
n is not an A. 
n is not a B. 
(For all :r) 
if :r is an A, 
then :r is a B. 
(For all :r) if 
:r is not an A, 
then :r is not a B. 
······-~-•--·~ .. .,__,,~-,..--,roe-,,, ~ . . . ·~,_·,~:-~I ~·~FkiJ!¾H4l£4NBt'I 
•.. ~· I;'' r ••• · , _. , ••• ··:•·. _::l;,:.,.1 
B. Formally Invalid Moves 
All A's are B's. 
n is a B. 
n is an A. 
All A's are B's. 
All B's are A's 
All A's are B's. 
n is not an A. 
n is not a B. 
All A's are B's. 
All non-A's are 
non-B's. 
Either p or Q. 
q. 
Not p. 
Either p or q. 
Either not q or 
not p. 
Either p or q. 
p. 
Not q. 
Either p or q. 
Either not p 
or not q. 
(For all :r) either :r 
is an A or :r is a B. 
n is a B. 
n is not an A. 
(For all :r) either :r 
is an A or :r is a B. 
(For all :r) either :r 
is not a B or :r 
is not an A. 
(For all :r) 
either :r 
is an A or :r is a B. 
n is an A. 
n is not a B. 
(For all :r) either :r 
is an A or :r is a B. 
(For all :r) either :r 
is not an A or :r 
is not a B. 
• "pn, "qi" and ur" stand for propositions. "xn is a variable term. 11n" is a term referring to some particular thing. "A.", uB;' and "C" are class name., or designators. 
111 The short horizontal line separates the prcmise{s) and the conclusion in each idealized argument form. 
c- Roberge has urged lhat "Either notp orq" be used here and elsewhere in this column (with a corresponding change in the other premise, if any), because 0 Eitherp or q" is logically equivalent to .. If not,, then 
q," rather than 1'l! p, then Q," He has a significant point, butl chose to use "Eitherp orq" because that is the most natural fonn of alternation. If one wants, one can think of .. P" in "Either p or Qn as 1t&ndin\ for .. not 
, i" in "Either not p I or q," which is equivalent to "If pi, then.Q." Alternately I one can think of the "p" in .. If p, then q" as "notp i" in order to achieve a Roberge-suggested equivalence: with .. Either I I or q. Similar 
comments a.pp\y to u(For allx) either ,xis an A or xis a.B ." To save space, the clause "but perhaps both" is omitted from each alternation, except \n the sixth row (a, b, c, a.nd d) where tht clauK is inappropriate. 




Invalid Moves" in Part B, any argument adhering to these 
forms is invalid. The first column of the table gives 
the name of the principles; the second and third columns 
present standard elementary principles of conditional 
reasoning; the fourth column illustrates the principles 
of class logic and the last two columns show the principles 
f 1 . 1 . 1 o a ternation ogic. 
As most of the studies in the area of propositional 
logic are focused on the conditional; there is a substantial 
amount of information which has been obtained concerning 
this operation. As in children, results of recent research 
on teenagers' ability to reason with conditional arguments 
(e.g., Berzonsky and Ondrako, 1974; Gardiner, 1966; 
Jansson, 1977; O'Brien, 1972; O'Brien, Shapiro and Realli, 
1971; Roberge, 1970, 1976, 1978; Taplin, Standenrnayer 
and Taddonio, 1974) have generally shown them to be 
more proficient with valid principles of inference than 
with invalid principles. In contrast, there is insufficient 
information concerning the growth of the other operations. 
The disjunctive, defined as any proposition which uses 
the logical connective "Either ... or" is one of these. 
Studies involving disjunctive arguments (e.g. 
Johnson-Laird and Tridgell, 1972; Roberge, 1974, 1976; 
Van Duyne, 1974) have been restricted to either the 
valid or the invalid principle but not both. Roberge 
(1977) predicted that arguments embodying an invalid 
principle of disjunction would be significantly more dif-
l h' h h h b d Int is paper, we ave c osen to use t e roa er term 
"disjunctive logic" rather than "alternation logic". 
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ficult than those embodying a valid principle. His results 
supported this prediction, and is thus concordant with 
the findings of recent research on teenagers' ability 
to reason with conditional principles. 
The content of the logical arguments is a factor 
which may influence the subjects' ability to draw valid 
inferences. For example, Long and Welch (1942) found 
with children (ages 8-11½ years old) as Wilkins (1928) 
and .Sells (1936) had with adults, that " ... the difficulty 
of applying a principle of reasoning increases as the 
meaningfulness of the term decreases". These findings 
have been reaffirmed in most studies dealing with conditonal 
arguments (e.g., Ennis and Paulus, 1968; Gardiner, 1966; Jansson, 
1977; Roberge and Paulus, 1971). For the disjunctive arguments 
Van Duyne ( 1097 4) reported that adults found no difference 
between sentences involving concrete content, e.g., "A 
student doesn't study French or he is at London" and sentences 
involving abstract content, e.g., "A card doesn't have 
a Pon one side or it has a 2 on the other side". Similar 
findings have been obtained by Roberge (1977) in a recent 
study. 
In the present study, an attempt is made to investi-
gate: 
(i) teenagers' ability to master deductive arguments 
of four basic principles in conditional and di~junctive 
logic with two types of content; and 
(ii) the influence of chronological age upon this 
ability. 
A 48-itern reasoning test was administered to 210 
teenagers. On the basis of their educational status, 
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the subjects were classified into three groups: fourth 
formers, sixth formers and university students. There 
were 70 subjects in each group with egual numbers of males 
and females. The mean ages at these three groups were 
14.95, 17.16 and 18.96 years respectively. The data were 
analysed using both the parametric analysis of variance 
and the non-parametric techniques. 
Compared to conditional reasoning,the amount of 
information on teenagers' use of disjunctive reasoning 
is scarce. 1n conditional reasoning, the valid principles 
are easier to master than the invalid principles; and 
content of the logical argument is an important factor 
in the ability to draw valid conclusions. In disjunctive 
reasoning, the studies done with adults seem to indicate 
that the valid principles are also easier to master than 
the invalid principles; and content of the arguments is 
insignificant to the ability to draw valid inferences. 
Given this information, it is expected that the 
valid principles would be easier to master than the invalid 
principles in both types of reasoning. It was also hypo-
thesized that the ability to judge these deductive arguments 
would depend upon the subjects' chronological age as well 
as the content of the arguments. 
Chapter two outlines the methodology employed in 
this study. Chapter three is divided~into four sections, 
where Section A deals with the proportion of subjects 
who have mastered each of the four principles of conditional 
and disjunctive reasoning; Section B is made up of the 
parametric analysis of variance results; Section C is 
17 
concerned with the non-parametric treatment of the data 
and Section D consists of a summary of the previous 
sections. The final chapter contains a comparison of the 
results obtained from the present study with previous work 




In order to ascertain the amount of logical under-
standing in teenagers, a 48-item reasoning test was cons-
tructed. The construction and administration of the test 
are outlined below. 
Subjects 
One hundred and forty students from forms four 
and six were selected from two mixed schools in Christchurch. 
The students were chosen on the basis of their Progressive 
Achievement Test scores. Only the upper 50% of the students 
were selected. The mean ages of the students in the two 
forms were 14.95 and 17.16 years, respectively. In addition, 
70 first-year university students were acquired on a voluntary 
basis from the University of Canterbury. The average 
age for this group of students was 18.96 years. 
On the basis of their educational status, these 
teenagers were classified into three groups: fourth formers, 
sixth formers and university students. There were 70 
subjects in each group with equal numbers of males and 
females. 
Materials 
A reasoning test consisting of 48 items was constructed. 
The reasoning test assessed the subjects' ability to master 
deductive arguments on four basic principles of conditional 
and disjunctive reasoning using two types of content. 
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(1) Types of principles 
The four types of principle in conditional reasoning 
and its isomorphs in disjunctive reasoning were adapted 
from Ennis (1976). The principles included detachment, 
particular contraposition, particular conversion and particular 
inversion (see Table 3). These four principles are summarised 
and illustrated in Tables 4 and 5. 
The first column gives the name of the principle, 
the second column indicates whether or not the form'.is 
valid as presented; the third column illustrates the symbolic 
form of the principle; and the fourth column gives a concrete 
example of the principle. 
(2) Content 
Two content categories were used: concrete and 
abstract. 
Concrete content implies that vocabulary familiar 
to the subject is used; and further, that the truth value 
of the premises is empirically neutral. Abstract content, 
on the other hand, uses various combinations of geometrical 
coloured figures. 
The two content categories are summarised and illu-
strated in Table 6. The first column identifies the content; 
the second column illustrates sample items for each content 
in conditional reasoning; and the third column shows sample 
items for each content category in disjunctive reasoning. 
(3) Test-items 
The item format was as follows: 
Suppose you know 
Premise number 1 
TABLE 4: The four basic principles of conditional reasoning. 
PRINCIPLE VALIDITY SYMBOLIC FORM 




2. Particular Contrapositive Yes If p, then g 
(Denying the 
consequent) Not g: 
Not p 










If the cat is black, then her 
name is Kitty. 
The cat is black 
The cat's name is Kitty 
If the car is black, then it 
is a police car. 
It is not a police car 
The car is not black 
If the picture belongs to Susan, 
then it is a picture of a girl. 
It is a picture of a girl 
The picture belongs to Susan 
If the car in the garage is 
Mr. Smith's>then it is white 
The car in the garage is not 
Mr. Smith's 
The car is not white 
I\) 
0 
TABLE 5: The four basic principles of disjunctive reasoning. 
PRINCIPLE VALIDITY SYMBOLIC FORM CONCRETE FORM 
1. Detachment Yes Either p or q Either Don is tall or Don is thin (or Don 
(or both) is both tall and thin). 
Not p Don is not tall• 




Contrapositive Yes Either p or q Either the car is new or the car is white 
(or both) (or the car is both new and white). 
Not q The car is not white. 
p The car is new. 
3. Particular No Either p or q Either Peter is sick or Peter is lazy-
Conversion (or both) (or Peter is both sick and lazy}. 
q Peter is lazy. 
p Peter is sick. 
4. Particular No Either p or q Either the house is old or the house is 
Inversion (or both) , grey - (or.· the~house is both old and.:grey) . 
p The house is old. 
q The house is grey. 
N 
r-' 





If the cat is black, 
then her name is 
( 
Kitty. 
If the square is red, 
then the triangle is 
blue. 
DISJUNCTIVE REASONING 
Either the cat is black 
or the cat is dirty (or 
the cat is both black and 
dirty). 
Either the square is red 
or the triangle is red 
(or both the square and 
the triangle are red). 
N 
N 
Premise number 2 
Then would this be true: 
Conclusion. 
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The possible responses which the subject could make were: 
"Yes", "No" and "Maybe". The meanings of the possible answers 




The answer must be true, 
The answer cannot be true, 
The answer may be true or may not be true. You 
were not told enough to be certain whether the 
answer is "Yes" or "No". 
(4) Test-design 
Six test-items were constructed for each of the four 
principles. 
The overall test-design was divided into two parts, 
Part 1 consisting of 24 concrete items, where 12 were of the 
conditional type and the other 12 of the disjunctive type. 
Similarly, Part 2 consisted of 24 abstract items, again divided 
into 12 conditional and 12 disjunctive types. Thus, there was 
a total of 48 items in the complete test. A copy of the 
complete test is presented in Appendix I. 
Procedure 
At the two schools, the reasoning tests were adminis-
tered separately for the fourth and the sixth formers. In both 
cases, the students were seated individually in their classrooms. 
The students were then told the general purpose·of the exercise 
and were encouraged to inquire about anything they wanted to 
know. 
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The test booklets were handed out to the students. 
Instructions were then read out by the investigator. These are 
presented in Appendix 2. The students were given half an hour 
to complete the tests. 
Similar procedures were carried out with the university 
students. 
After the exercise, a few questions were posed by the 
investigator concerning the nature of the test. The general 
replies seemed to indicate: 
(i) that subjects found no difference between the 
items presented in Part 1 and the items presented 
in Part 2, and 
(ii) that subjects found the "Either ... or" arguments 




The first section of this chapter is concerned with 
the _proportion of subjects who have mastered the four basic 
principles of deductive reasoning. Since each principle 
subtest contains three items yielding a range from zero 
tothree, mastery is defined as a correct score of three 
out of the three items. Following this discussion, the 
statistical analysis of the data will be presented. The 
data were analysed using both parametric and non-parametric 
statistics. The parametric analysis of variance was used 
although it is clear that the normality assumptions will 
not be completely fulfilled when a four-category dependent 
variable is used. However, the resulting tests of significance 
should still give useful estimates of the relative strengths 
of effects. As a check on the analysis of variance results, 
non-parametric analyses were carried out; the results 
of which are presented in the next section of the chapter. 
A. PROPORTION OF SUBJECTS WHO HAVE MASTERED THE FOUR 
PRINCIPLES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 
The proportion of subjects who have mastered 
each of the four basic principles of deductive reasoning 
are shown in Table 7. The table indicates: 
(i) Increasing mastery with age for the four 
principles in the two types of reasoning as well as within 
the two types of content; 
(ii) Little difference in the proportion of subjects 
TABLE 7: Proportion of subjects who have mastered the four basic principles of 
conditional · and disjunctive reasoning in concrete and abstract content. 
CONDITIONAL REASONING 
EDUCATIONAL CONTENT Particular Particular Particular 
Detachment Contrapos- Conversion Inversion Detachment 
LEVEL ition. 
Fourth Concrete .74 .24 ,26 .17 .39 
formers 
(N = 70) Abstract .90 .31 .14 .30 .40 
Sixth Concrete . 79 .36 .56 .31 . 67 
formers 
(N = 70) Abstract .99 .59 .44 .49 . 71 
University Concrete . 93 .51 .56 .37 .89 
Students 







.66 . 76 
• 63 .80 
















EDUCATION AL Detachment Particular I Particular Particular 
Contraposition Conversion Inversion 
Fourth 
Formers 0.17 0.03 0.04 0.00 
(N = 7 0) 
Sixth 
Formers 0.50 0.13 0.26 0.26 
(N = 7 0) 
University 
Students 0.69 0.26 0.33 0.20 
(N = 70) 
N 
-..J 
mastering the principles in either the concrete or the 
abstract content; 
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(iii) With the exception of the detachment principle 
in conditional reasoning, there is a larger proportion 
of subjects mastering the principles in disjunctive reasoning 
than the principles in conditional reasoning; 
(iv) In conditional reasoning (for both types of 
content), the proportion of subjects mastering the detachment 
principle is the largest, whereas the proportions of 
subjects mastering the other three principles are much 
lower; 
(v) In disjunctive reasoning (for both types of 
content), the proportions of subjects mastering each 
of the invalid principles, conversion and inversion, 
are slightly larger than the proportions of subjects 
mastering each of the valid principles, detachment and 
contraposition. This holds in all instances, except 
with the fourth formers, for items in concrete content. 
Table 8 presents the proportion of subjects who 
have mastered the four principle§ of both the conditional 
and the disjunctive reasoning. As can be seen from the 
table, only a small proportion of subjects have mastered 
these principles in the two types of reasoning. 
It is instructive to compare the results obtained 
in this study with those of earlier studies. These previous 
researchers have listed only the results of deductive 
arguments in conditional reasoning with concrete content. 
Thus ,we can only compare the results of the four principles 
I 
of conditional reasoning with concrete content. These 
results are summarised in Table 9. As can be seen from 
TABLE 9: Percentages of subjects who have mastered each of the four basic principles of 




Particular Particular Particular n/N 
Contraposition Conversion Inversion 
4 53 35 2 2 8/12 
5 51 30 2 3 5/6 
4 - 5 59 16 0 2 5/6 
6 54 23 0 0 8/12 
7 56 41 3 6 5/6 
6 - 7 79 23 0 2 5/6 
8 95 74 0 0 8/12 
8 71 43 1 6 6/8 
9 66 35 4 5 5/6 
8 - 9 89 48 4 4 5/6 
10 100 65 19 5 8/12 
10 76 53 3 5 6/8 
------- -------- -------- -------- -------- =~z1== _ 10 74 24 26 17 ------- -------- -------- -------- --------
11 62 35 3 12 5/6 
11 - 12 99 47 30 20 5/6 
12 93 44 6 19 6/8 
------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ------
12 79 36 56 31 -~!'.'.'.~--------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Pre-Service Ele-
mentary School 84 31 11 21 6/8 
Teachers 
-------- -------- -------- -------- ------
University Students 93 51 56 37 -~!'.'.'.~---------- -------- -------- --------
RESEARCHER 
Roberge (1970) 
Ennis & Paulus 
Gardiner (1965) 
Roberge 














----------Mohd. Noor ---------- ' 





the table, the detachment principle is by far the easiest. 
The results of the earlier studies also indicate that the 
contraposition principle is relatively easier than the 
two invalid principles, conversion and inversion. In contrast, 
our results show that the contraposition principle is just 
as difficult as the invalid principles, conversion and 
inversion. 
B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
A 3 x 2 x2 x 2 x 4 (Educational level by sex by type 
of content by type of reasoning by type of principle) 
factorial design, with repeated measures on the last three 
factors, was used. The analysis of variance results are 
presented in Table 10. Cross-tabulations of the significant 
two-way interactions are given in Table 11. 
There is a significant (£< .01) improvement with 
age as students move from the fourth form level to the 
university level (Table 10). This improvement can be 
seen in Figure 1. 
















Fourth formers Sixth formers University students 
Educational levels 
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TABLE 10: Results of the analysis of variance for educational 
levels, sex, type of content, type of reasoning and 
type of principle. 
SOURCE df MS F 
Between Subjects 
G (Educational level) 2 180.98 52.56** 
X (Sex) 1 3.87 1.12 
G x X 2 1. 65 .48 
Subjects within groups 204 3.44 
Within Subjects 
C (Type of content) 1 2.30 3.26 
G X C 2 .04 .05 
X X C 1 .08 .11 
G X Xx C 2 .19 .26 
C X Subjects within groups 204 .71 
R (Type of reasoning) 1 92.67 55.90** 
G X R 2 8.06 4.86* 
X X R 1 6.34 3.83 
G X X X R 2 .09 .05 
R X Subjects within.gr,oups 204 1. 66 
p (Type of principle) 3 49.39 64.07** 
G x p 6 2.98 3.87** 
X X p 3 .46 .60 
G X X X p 6 .63 .82 
p X Subjects within groups 612 .77 
C X R 1 11.43 19.74** 
G X C X R 2 .81 1.40 
X X C X R 1 1. 54 2.66 
G X X X C x R 2 .39 .67 
C X Rx Subjects within 204 .58 
groups 
C X p 3 2 ,'90 6.41** 
G X C X p 6 .75 1.65 
X X C X p 3 1.07 2.37 
G X X X C X P 6 .19 .43 
C X p X Subjects within 612 .45 
groups 
R X p 3 68.81 91.71** 
G X RX p 6 4.31 5.75** 
X X RX p 3 1. 32 1.76 
G X X X R X P 6 .60 .80 
RX p X Subjects within 612 .75 
groups 
C X RX p 3 6.91 14.70** 
G X C X RX p 6 . 95 2.03 
X X C X R X p 3 .28 .59 
G X X X C X R X p 6 .35 .74 
C X R X p X Subjects within 612 .47 
groups 
** E < • 01 
* E <. 05 
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TABLE 11: Cross-tabulations of the significant two-way 











Fourth form. ,_. 2.30 
Sixth form. 2.64 
University 2.89 













TYPE OF PRINCIPLE 
Contraposition Conversion 
1. 71 1. 55 
2.22 2.25 
2.57 2.57 
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Contraposition Conversion 








There is no significant difference between the scores 
of the males and the scores of the females (Table 10). This 
can be seen in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2: Percentage of correct responses for the two sexes 
1©0 
90 
















There is no significant difference between items embedded 
in the concrete content and items embedded in the abstract 
content (Table 10). This can be seen in Figure 3. 
There is a significant (E< .01) difference between 
conditional reasoning and disjunctive reasoning (Table 
10). This difference can be seen in Figure 4. 
The 'type of reasoning by educational level' interaction 
effect is significant (E< .01). In Table 11, it is apparent 
that the difference is most.pronounced at the university 
level, where the disjunctive reasoning is much easier 
than the conditional reasoning. This difference is illustrated 
in Figure 5. 
FIGURE 3: Percentage of correct responses for the two 
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FIGURE 4: Percentage of correct responses for the two 
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FIGURE 5: Percentage of correct responses for the 'type 


























The 'type of reasoning by type of content' interaction 
effect is also significant (p< .01). In Table 11, it 
can be seen that the difference occurs mainly with the 
abstract content, where the disjunctive reasoning is again 
easier than the conditional reasoning. This difference 
is illustrated in Figure 6. 
There is a significant Jp_< .01) difference between 
the four types of principles (Table 10). As can be seen 
in Figure 7, this is due to the difference between the 
detachment principle and the other three principles. 
The 'type of principle by educational level' interaction 
effect is significant (E< .01). Table 11 shows that this 
difference occurs at all the three educational levels 
between the detachment principle and the other three prin-
ciples. Figure 8 illustrates this interaction. 
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FIGURE 6: Percentage of correct responses for the 'type 
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FIGURE 7: Percentage of correct responses for the four 
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FIGURE 8: Percentage of correct responses for the 'type 
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The 'type of principle by type of content' interaction 
effect is also significant (E < • 01) . Table 11 shows that this 
interaction is due to the detachment principle and the other 
three principles in both types of content. Figure 9 illus-
trates this interaction. 
Table 10 also shows a significant (E < • 01) 'type of 
principle by type of reasoning' interaction effect. In 
Table 11, it is apparent that this difference occurs with 
the conditional reasoning, where the detachment principle 
is much easier than the other three principles. This 
difference is illustrated in Figure 10. 
The 'educational level by type of reasoning by type of 
principle' interaction effect is significant (E < .01). The 
cross-tabulations of this interaction can be seen in Table 
12. The table shows that for conditional reasoning, there 
are differences between the detachment principle and the 
38 
and the other three principles. In contrast, there are no 
differences between the four princip1Js of disjunctive reason-
ing. The differences occur at each of the three educational 
levels. Figures lla and llb illustrate this interaction. 































Type of content 
FIGURE 10: Percentage of correct responses for the 'type of 
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Type of reasoning 
TABLE 12: Cross-tabulations of the 'educational level by type of reasoning by 
type of principle' interaction. 
EDUCATIONAL TYPE OF PRINCIPLE 
LEVEL Detachment Particular Particular REASONING Contraposi:tion Conversion 
Conditional 2.78 1. 59 1.11 
Fourth formers 
Disjunctive 1.82 1. 82 1.98 
Conditional 2.86 2.06 2.00 
Sixth formers 
Disjunctive 2.41 2.38 2.50 
Conditional 2.91 2.31 2.25 
University 












FIGURE 11: Percentage of correct responses for the 
'educational level by type of reasoning by 
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Fourth formers Sixth formers University students 
Educational level. 
(a) Conditional Reasoning 
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Fourth formers Sixth formers University students 
Educational level 
(b) Disjunctive Reasoning 
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Finally, Table 10 indicates a significant (£ < .01) 
'type of content by type of reasoning by type of principle' 
interaction effect. The cross-tabulations of this interaction 
are given by Table 13. From the table, it can be seen that 
the results obtained in both types of content are similar, 
i.e., there are differences between the detachment principle 
and the other three principles in conditional reasoning, 
whereas the four principles in disjunctive reasoning are 
similar. Figures 12a and 12b illustrate these differences. 
C. NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSES 
As a check on the parametric analysis of variance 
results, non-parametric analyses were carried out. The refer-
ence for the various non-parametric statistics used in this 
section is the book by Marascuilo and Mcsweeney (1977). 
(1) Educational Levels 
Using the Kruskall-Wallis test, a significant (£ < .05) 
difference is obtained for the subjects' total scores at 
the three educational levels. As the null hypothesis 
of identical distributions for the scores is rejected, 
possible reasons for this rejection must be examined from 
a post hoc point of view. As there is approximately a 
two-year gap between one educational level and the next, 
a trend analysis is carried out. The results of this 
analysis are summarised in Table 14. From the table, it 
is clear that there is a monotonic or linear relationship 
between subjects' total scores and their respective educa-
tional levels. Inspection of the ranked means at these 
three levels indicates that the relationship is monotonically 
increasing. 
TABLE 13: Cross~tabulations of the 'type of content x type of reasoning 
x type of pr~nciple' interaction. 
CONTENT TYPE OF 
PRINCIPLE 
REASONING Particular Particular 
Detachment Contrapositive Conversion 
Conditional 2.78 2.07 .. 2. 07 
Concrete 
Disjunctive 2.37 2.35 2.38 
Conditional 2.92 1. 91 1.51 
Abstract 










FIGURE 12: Percentage of correct responses for the 'type 
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Type of reasoning 
(b) Abstract content 
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TABLE 14: Partitioning of the Kruskall-Walli~ statistic in 
tests for monotonic trend. 
SOURCE .. DEGREE OF. .F.REEDOM VALUE OF x2 
•Monotonic trend 1 70.89 
Residual 2 .50 
Total 3 71. 39 
FOURTH FORMERS. SIXTH FORMERS UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 
Ranked ' 
means 60:05 109.56 146.53 
(2) Sex Differences 
Using Ehe Mann-Whitney test, no significant dif= 
ferences are obtained between the scores of the males and 
the scores of the females at each of the three educational 
levels. This can be seen in Figure 13. 
FIGURE 13: Percentage of correct responses for the males 
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Educational levels 
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(3) Type of Content 
Using the Friedman test, no significant differences 
are obtained between the two types of content at each of the 
three educational levels. This can be seen in Figure 14. 
FIGURE 14: Percentage of correct responses for items in 
concrete and abstract content at each of the 
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Fourth formers Sixth formers University students 
Educational levels 
(4) Type of R~asoning 
The two types of reasoning are repeated within both 
the concrete and the abstract content. Using the Friedman 
test, the reasoning data are separately analysed within the 
concrete and the abstract content. Table 15 summarises the 
findings at each of the three educational levels. As can be 
seen from the table, all differences between the two types of 
reasoning are •significant (£ < .05), except for the difference 
between the two types of reasoning within the concrete content 
TABLE 15: Differences between the two types of reasoning within the 
two types of content at each of the three educational levels. 
EDUCATIONAL CONTENT TYPE OF REASONING LEVEL Conditional Disjunctive 
Concrete Ranked sum 110 100 
Fourth Ranked mean 1.57 1.43 
formers 
Abstract Ranked sum 116 94 
Ranked mean 1. 66 1.34 
Concrete Ranked sum 119.5 90.5 
Sixth Ranked mean 1.71 1. 29 
formers Abstract Ranked sum 116 94 
Ranked mean 1. 66 1.34 
Concrete Ranked sum 127.5 82.5 
University Ranked mean 1.82 1.18 
students Abstract Ranked sum 128.5 81.5 
Ranked mean 1.84 1.16 











at the fourth form level. Table 15 also gives the ranked 
sums and means of the two types of reasoning within each type 
of content. In all instances, disjunctive reasoning obtains 
smaller values than conditional reasoning, indicating that it 
is easier to comprehend than conditional reasoning. 
( 5) Type of Principle 
The four types of principles are repeated within the 
two types of content as well as within the two types of reason-
ing. As there are differences between the two types of 
reasoning, it is necessary to separate the four principles of 
conditional reasoning from the four principles of disjunctive 
reasoning. The resulting data are then analysed by the Fried-
man test. 
For the four principles of conditional reasoning, 
significant (£ < .05) differences are obtained between them 
at each of the three educational levels. Since the null 
hypothesis of identical distributions for the four types of 
principle is rejected, possible reasons for the rejection may 
be explained by means of post hoc comparisons on contrasts 
involving the ranked values. The six possible pairwise com-
parisons at each of the three educational levels are summarised 
in Table 16. It is apparent from the table that the detachment 
principle is different from the other three principles, 
contraposition, conversion and inversion. In addition, there 
are no differences between contraposition, conversion and 
inversion. 
As for the four principles of disjunctive reasoniryg, 
no significanu differences are obtained between them at each 
of the three educational levels. 
TABLE 16: Results of the pairwise comparisons between the four principles in 
conditional reasoning at each of the three educational levels .. 
I' 
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL COMPARISON ( if; ) . VALUE 'OF COMPARISON 
iJJ1 = R detach. - R contrap. 1.21 - 2.76 = -1.55 
if; ;i. = R detach. -- R conver. 1.21 - 3.19 = -1.98 
if;3 = R detach. -Fourth formers - R inver. 1.21 - 2.80 = ~1.59 
if;4 = R contrap. -- R conver. 2.76 - 3.19 = - .43 
iJJs = R contrap. - R inver. 2.76 - 2.80 = - .04 
1fJ6 = R conver. - R inver. 3.19 - 2.80 = + .39 
if;1 = R detach. -- R contrap. 1.55 - 2.71 = -1.16 
if; 2 = R detach. -- R conver. 1.55 - 2.67 = -1.12 
Sixth formers if;3 = R detach. - R inver. 1.55 - 3.06 = -1.51 
if;4 = R contrap. - R conver. 2.71 - 2.67 = + .04 
iJJs = R contrap. - R inver. 2.71 - 3.06 = - .35 
if;5 = R conver. - R inver. 2.67 - 3.06 = - .39 
iJJ1 = R detach. - R contrap. 1.56 - 2.59 = -1.03 
if; 2 = R detach. - R conver. 1.56 - 2.68 = -1.12 
lJ;3 = R detach. - R inver. 1.56 - 3.19 = -1.63 
University students if;4 = R contrap. - R conver. 2.59 - 2.68 = - .09 
iJJs = R contrap. - R inver. 2.59 - 3.19 = - .60 
- -
if; 6 = R conver. - R inver. 2.68 - 3.19 = - .31 























As the normality assumptions of the parametric analysis 
of variance are not completely fulfilled, the results can-
not be taken as totally valid. Certain non-parametric 
analyses are carried out. These non-parametric analyses 
serve as checks on the analysis of variance results as well as 
providing a separate technique of analysing the data without 
making any underlying assumptions, as was the case in the 
analysis of variance. From the previous section, it can 
be seen that the results of the non-parametric analyses are 
highly similar to those of the parametric analysis of 
variance. Thus, even though the normality assumptions of the 
parametric analysis of variance are not completely ful-
filled, the resulting parametric tests of significance still 
yield estimates that are informative and useful. 
The results of both analyses indicate that mastery 
of the four basic principles of deductive logic improves 
with age. Further, the results indicate no difference bet-
ween the two sexes relative to their performance on the rea-
soning test. The results also indicate that subjects find 
no difference in difficulty between items within the concrete 
content and items within the abstract content. The results 
also show that there are differences between subjects' 
mastery of the detachment principle and the other three 
principles of conditional reasoning. By contrast, there is no 
difference between subjects' mastery of the four principles 
in disjunctive reasoning. Finally, the results show that 
subjects find items in disjunctive reasoning easier to master 




In the present study, we have examined teenagers' 
ability to master deductive arguments. These arguments are 
based on four basic principles of conditional and disjunctive 
reasoning, with two types of content. 
The results obtained have replicated the previously 
established finding (e.g., Roberge and Paulus, 1971; Jansson, 
1977) that performance on conditional reasoning tasks shows 
a general improvement with age. This finding may be con-
sidered to indicate that conditional reasoning becomes more 
logical with age. However, an equally possible conclusion 
to draw would be that the meaning of the conditional has 
changed with age, and that reasoning at all ages is logical. 
Taplin et al (1974) considers the second possibility as 
being more likely. According to him, the nature of this 
change for the conditional is as follows: 
" ... juxtaposition in its most primitive form appears 
to refer to conjunctive connectives between events. 
With increasing age; however, this interpretation is 
superceded by a biconditional or equivalence relation 
between events. In effect, the bond between the 
events has become such that not only do they occur 
together, but also whenever one is absent, the other 
is absent too. With further development this inter-
pretation may be modified again until, in addition 
to the preceding meanings, the second event may 
sometimes occur in the absence of the first, although 
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the first may not occur without the second." (pg. 371) 
Thus he concludes 
"It is not that college students are necessarily more 
logical than third-grade pupils, but that they have a 
different understanding of the meaning of the premises." 
The present study shows that within the age range 
studied, both alternatives are possible. However, these two 
alternatives are not contradictory to one another. In fact they 
complement each other. Within this context, Taplin's (1974) 
explanations show how the subjects have become more logical with 
age, i.e., they have become more logical with age because their 
understanding of the meaning of the conditional premises has 
changed with age. As Henle (1962) states 
" ... If individuals naive about specifications in 
propositional logic do not interpret 'if ... then' according 
to the conditional classification, it is not valid to 
conclude that their reasoning is in error. They are 
illogical only in the sense that they do not interpret the 
'if ... then' connective according to one unique specifi-
cation which from a psychological point l""\-F 'tT; L""'\Ta7 '-'..L V...L~YYf is 
arbitrary. When reasoning 'if p then q' is evaluated 
according to the interpretation each individual gives to 
the sentence, the inference may be perfectly consistent 
and logical with respect to that interpretation." (pg. 374) 
The same explanations can also be applied to disjunctive 
reasoning. It is feasible that there is a change in subjects' 
understanding of the meaning of the "either ... or" connective 
with age, indicating that they have become more logical. 
From the results of the present study, it can ~e seen 
that the factor sex and its interactions with the other four 
factors are not significant. These findings are consistent 
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with those reported in previous studies (e.g. Ennis, 1971; 
O'Brien and Shapiro, 1968; Roberge, 1970, 1978). 
Funther, the results show that subjects reason equally 
well with items embedded in the concrete and abstract content. 
For disjunctive argument~ this finding is consistent with 
those reported in earlier studies (e.g. Van Duyne, 1974; Roberge, 
1977). However, for conditional arguments, this finding is not 
consistent with those of previous studies (e.g. Johnson-Laird, 
Legrenzi and Legrenzi, 1972; Wason, 1968; Wason and Johnson-
Laird, 1972). A possible explanation for the discrepant 
findings is suggested by the nature of the tasks used in these 
studies. That is, in the present study the subjects were 
presented with a pair of premises and were asked to construct the 
conclusion that followed logically from these premises. In 
contrast, Wason and his followers used a problem-solving situa-
tion in which the subjects were shown four cards (or envelopes) 
and were asked to select the cards (or envelopes) needed to 
determine whether a given logical rule was true (or false). In 
other words, the inconsistent findings for these studies suggest 
that the type of content that is most beneficial in a given 
problem-solving situation varies according to the novelty 
of the task and the task demands. 
The results also show that subjects' mastery of items 
in disjunctive reasoning is much larger than those in condi-
tional reasoning. This greater difficulty with the latter 
may be due to the fact that with conditional reasoning, the 
subject must consider not only the form of the statements 
but also their order. Further, the subject must determine 
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not only whether the conclusion follows from the premises 
but also whether it is the only conclusion that can follow. 
The difficulties involved in doing all this may be sufficient 
'to account for the relative failure of the conditional. 
As Wason and Johnson-Laird (1969) state 
" ... It is as if the 'either ... or' expression itself 
creates uncertainty. It breaks up the 'direction' 
which seems to be strongly imposed- by the conditional, 
;if ... then' sentence. With a conditional the indi-
vidual is likely to be confident but wrong; with a 
disjuncti6n~ he is more likely to be unconfident but 
right. The meaning of a conditional gives no hint 
of the negation or falsity which underlies its logic. 
The disjunctive expression makes this element explicit, 
but this seems to weaken the grounds upon which any 
inference can be made." (pg. 20) 
Thus, there seem to be inherent difficulties with the con-
ditional expression. 
In conditional reasoning, the proportion of subjects 
mastering the items of the detachment principle is very 
much larger than that mastering the items of the contra-
position, conversion and inversion principles. The difficulty 
of these three principles relative to the detachment principle 
is present at all three educational levels. Wason's (1968) 
interpretation for the difficulty of these three principles 
is of relevance. His explanation depends upon two assumptions. 
First, 
" ... individuals are not constrained by the rules of 
propositional logic. They implicitly assume that a 
conditional sentence can have three outcomes or truth 
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values: p.q is true, p.q is false and p with either 
q or q is irrelevant." (pg. 274) 
This assumption explains why the invalid inference conversion 
occurs: q is selected in order to see whether it is associ-
ated with p making the conditional true. It also explains 
why the invalid inference inversion happens: pis irrelevant 
to the truth or falsity of the sentence. 
Wason's (1968) second assumption explains the infre-
quency of the contrapositive inference; why pis so seldom 
deduced from q. This assumption states: 
" ... individuals are biased, through a long learning 
procesa, to expect a relation or truth, correspondence 
or match to hold between sentences and states of 
affairs. In adult experience truth is encountered 
more frequently than falsity, and we seldom use a 
proposition or judgement that something is false in 
order to make a deduction." 
In other words, having convinced themselves that p.q, was 
true, subjects rarely used the transformation (p.q.) = (p.q) 
to test the truth value of p.q; apparently they regarded this 
association as being irrelevant. (pg. 274) 
These explanatory assumptions of Wason seem to accord 
with the present finding. Thus, it seems most likely that 
our subjects do indeed reason as he has postulated. 
To summarise, the results of teenagers' ability to 
master deductive arguments based on four principles of con-
ditional and disjunctive reasoning, is very largely consistent 
with the findings of previous publications in this area. The 
findings specific to this study include: 
(i) In conditional reasoning, subjects find no dif-
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ference between items embedded in the concrete and abstract 
content. 
(ii) In conditional reasoning, subjects find the valid 
principle contraposition to be just as difficult as the invalid 
principles of conversion and inversion; and 
(iii) In disjunctive reasoning, subjects find no dif~ 
ference between the valid and the invalid principles. 
A partial explanation to account for the first dis-
crepancy has been presented. In addition, all three differ-
ences observed in the present study may be due to the limited 
range of scores in each principle subtest. This range 
between zero and three in each principle subtest may not have 
provided enough discrimination between them when finer 
distinctions are needed. 
Having thus .established the similarities and differences 
between the present study and previous publications on teen-
agers' ability to master deductive arguments; the next 
objective is to suggest some factors which may influence the 
subjects' deductive ability to reason. 
In reasoning experiments, subjects are normally 
required to infer conclusions from given premises or to 
evaluate the truth of logical statements in relation to 
given evidence. A common feature of these studies is that 
an arbitrary criterion of the correctness of subjects' 
responses is provided by the rules of propositional logic. 
Experimenters have tended to be over-influenced by the 
lqgical structures of the problems when interpreting the 
observed behaviour or their subjects and have tended to over-
look for explanations quite unconnected with logic. An example 
would be the "atmospheric effect" of syllogistic inference 
(Woodworth and Sells, 1935; Seals, 1936): subjects are 
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assumed to ignore the logical structure of the problems and 
evaluate the conclusions of the argument according to whether 
they match the atmosphere of the premises. For example, 
a premise containing a negative creates a bias towards 
choosing a conclusion which contains a negative. 
In reasoning and language comprehension, there are 
both linguistic and non-linguistic factors that influence 
the manner in which individuals may glean information from 
sentences. Such a sentence contains linguistic information 
about the content as well as the relation between the ante-
cedent (p) and the consequent (q) propositions. Specifically, 
the content of the proposition can be abstract or symbolic, 
or semantically concrete and meaningful. In addition, the 
semantic relation between concrete propositions can express, 
for example, attribute description or causality. And finally, 
there is the connective logically joining the propositions, 
which may be the conditional "if ... then"; some semantic 
equivalent such as "since" or "because"; or even a logically 
different connective such as the disjunctive "either ... or~. 
These variables are linguistic in thau they explicitly 
contribute to th~ structure of the sentence and, taken 
independently, all have some denotative meanings as assigned 
by semantics. The complete interpreted meaning of a sentence 
is usually not entirely given by the denotative meaning in 
the linguistic structure of the sentence. Instead, the com-
plete meaning of an expression usually encompasses connotation 
as well. Connotative meaning is interpreted not from the 
linguistic structure of the sentence but from non-linguistic, 
pragmatic factors pertaining to the use of the sentence which 
include empirical knowledge of the world as well as contextual 
presuppositions. 
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In addition, the "matching bias" effect suggested by 
Evans 1 (1972a)i is another variable which may affect the 
subjects' ability to reason. In the original experiment 
subjects are asked to construct verifying and falsifying 
cases of conditional rules, in which the presence and absence 
of negative components were systematically varied. 1 A 
totally unexpected factor dominated the results: subjects 
tended to choose values which matched rather than altered 
values named in the rules, irrespective of the presence of 
negatives. For example, when asked to falsify a rule such 
as "If there is not a red triangle on the left then there 
is a blue circle on the right 11 , most subjects placed a red 
triangle to the left of a blue circle. Logically this 
constitutes a combination of a false antecedent and a true 
consequent. The logically correct combination, true ante-
cedent and false consequent, was least often given on this 
rule, which is the only one where alteration of both named 
values would be necessitated, e.g. by placing a green square 
to the left of a blue triangle. Thus, Evans states 
1 
" ... It would seem that the subjects' understanding 
of an 'if ... then' sentence entails some appreciation 
of when the rule may be true or false, but for cases 
where such influence is weak the operational effects 
of matching takes over. The relative effects of mat-
ching suggest that while the false antecedent cases 
are psychologically 'irrelevant' (Wason, 1966) 
subjects are more competent at the task of verification 
than falsification." 
Four rules were used of the general form: if p then q, 
if p then not q, if not p then q and if not p then not q. 
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These "non-logical" factors must be considered in 
evaluating reasoning. These factors interact with the logical 
form in that they influence the interpretation of the bask 
and the material employed. Wundt (1880) long ago pointed out 
the necessity of considering the global structure of knowledge 
and the variety of processing strategies an individual 
possesses and uses to interpret information. Thus, the 
requirements of the task as well as the information individuals 
are asked to make inferences about are not dealt with in 
isolation but rather become the focal point of the total 
picture within an interactive, global system. 
The final objective of the discussion is to present 
some implications for the kind of study we have carried out. 
Besides the general theoretical interest of such a study to 
developmental specialists, studies in this area provide 
information about teenagers' ability to master deductive 
arguments. This is done by providing information about the 
way teenagers use conditional and disjunctive reasoning. The 
results of the present study show that teenagers find dis-
junctive ~easoning easier to master than conditional 
reasoning, and that they do know some of the fundamental 
principles of these two types of reasoning. The results of 
the present study also indicate possible sources of difficulty 
(e.g. the presence of negatives) implicit in the given 
propositions. Studies in the area of propositional logic 
further provide information concerning the current level of 
cognitive operations in teenagers as they result from current 
and past life experiences. This kind of information is 
-
important because of the shortage of empirical experimental 
research during teenage years, especially in teenagers' 
59 
development of disjunctive reasoning. Thus, the area of 
disjunctive logic provides obvious lines of research which 
need to be developed. 
One of the widely accepted objectives of education in 
general is to help students think critically. One aspect of 
critical thinking is the ability to test the logical validity 
of an argument. This is an important &bility in everyday 
life when arguments such as "Communists favour U.S. withdrawal 
from Vietnam. Bill favours U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. 
Therefore, Bill is a Communist" are widely accepted as valid. 
Thus, it is necessary to implement this concept of critical 
thinking in students. 
Another implication of such work can be found in the 
concept of "economy of thought"; whereby arguments can be 
expressed in more efficient logical forms. 
Finally, a potential implication of such work is in 
the area of computer programming. With the increasing use 
of computers in schools, it is essential for the students to 
acquire the necessary programming skills. As computer prog-
rammers normally make use of the basic principles of logic 
in constructing sentences, it is necessary for the students 
to be acquainted with these logical principles. Once ·they 
are familiar with the basic principles of propositional logic, 
it may well be much easier for them to acquire programming 
skills. 
Conclusions 
Both parametric and non-parametric analyses indicate 
that mastery of the four basic principles of deductive logic 
improves with age. Further, the results indicate no difference 
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between the two sexes relative to their performance on the 
reasoning test. The results indicate that subjects find no 
difference between items embedded in the concrete and the 
abstract content. The results also show that there are 
differences between subjects' mastery of the detachment 
principle and the other three principles of conditional 
reasoning. In contrast, there is no difference between 
subjects' mastery of the four principles of disjunctive 
reasoning. Finally, the results show that subjects find 
items within disjunctive reasoning easier to master than those 
within conditional reasoning. These results on teenagers' 
ability to master deductive arguments are consistent with the 
findings of previous publications in this area. The findings 
specific to this study include: 
(i) In conditional reasoning, subjects find no 
difference between items embedded in the concrete and the 
abstract content; 
(ii) In conditional reasoning, subjects find the valid 
principle contraposition to be just as difficult as the invalid 
principles of conversion and inversion; and 
(iii) In disjunctive reasoning, subjects find no dif-
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APPENDIX I 
THE REASONING TEST 
where 
II YES II means 
II NO" means 
USE OF LOGICAl PRINCIPLES 
Part I 
YOU CAN CHOOSE YES, NO, MAYBE 
II THE ANSWER MUST BE TRUE" 
II THE ANSWER CANNOT BE TRUE 11 , 
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and 
II MA y BE II means II THE ANSWER MAY BE TRUt OR MAY. NOT BE TRUE. 
YOU WERE NOT TOLD ENOUGH TO BE CERTAIN WHETHER 
THE ANS~IER IS 1 YEs 1 · OR 1 N0 1 • 11 
EXAMPLE ONE: 
SUPPOSE YOU KNOW 
IF THE COAT rs BRO~N, THEN IT BELONGS TO 
MR SMITH. 
THE COAT IS BROWN. 
THEN WOULD THIS BE TRUE: 
THE COAT BELONGS TO MR SMITH? 
Tick the correct answer. 
The answer in this example is YES for if the coat is 
brown, then it b~longs to Mi Smith. 
SUPPOSE YOU KNOW 
IF THE COAT IS BROWN, THEN IT BELONGS TO 
MR SMITH. 
THE COAT BELONGS TO MR SMITH. 
THEN WOULD THIS BE TRUE: 
THE COAT IS BROWN? 
The answer in this ~xample is MAYBE for the coat 












EITHER DON IS TALL OR DON IS THIN (OR DON 
IS BOTH TALL AND THIN). 
DON IS NOT TALL. 
HOULD THIS BE TRUE: 
DON IS THIN? 
answer in this example ; s 
i s not ta 11 , then . he must 
YES for given th~t 
be thin . 
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I ✓, YES 
• No 
D MAYBE 
1. Suppose you know 
If the cat is black, then its name is Kitty. 
The cat is black. 
Then wouldthis be true: 
The cat's name is .Kitty? 
2. Suppose you know 
If the picture belong~ to Mary, then it' is a picture 
of a girl. 
It is a pictur~ of a girl. 
Then would this be true: 
The picture belongs to Mary? 
3. Suppose you know 
If the dog's name is Lassie, then she is white. 
The dog is not white: 
Then would this be true: 
The dog's name is Lassie? 
4. Suppose you know 
If the dog is brown~ then its name is Rover. 
The dog is not brown. 
Then would this be true: 
The dog's name is not Rover? 
5. Suppose you know 
If the scarf is yellow, then it belongs to Sue. 
The scarf belongs to Sue. 
Then would this be .true: 
The scarf·is yellow? 
6. Suppose you know 
If Peter goes to the fair,then he will meet his friend John. 
Today, Peter is goi'ng to the fair. . 
Then would this be true: 
Today, Peter will meet his friend John? 
7. Suppose you know 
If the car in the garage is Mr Smith's, then it is black. 
The car in the garage is not.Mr Smith's. 
Then would this be true: 
The car is not black? 
8. Suppose you know 
If the car .is black, then it is a police car. 
It is not a police car. 
Then would this be true: 


























9. Suppose you know 
· If the cat's name is Tammy, then she. is white. 
.The cat's name is not Tammy. 
Then would this be true: 
The cat is not white? 
10. S4ppose you know 
If the ball in the garden is white, then it belongs to John. 
The ball in the garden is white. 
Then would this be true: 
The ball belongs to John? 
lh Suppose you know 
If Peter is tall, then Don is short: 
Don is not short. 
Then would this be true: 
Peter is tall? 
12. Suppose you know 
If the box is brown, then it contains a dozen plates. 
The box_ contains a dozen plates~ 
Then would this be true·: 
The box is brown? 
13. Suppose you know 
Either the car is new or the car is white (or the car is 
both new and white). 
The car is not white. 
Then would this be true: 
The car is new? 
14. Suppose you know 
Either Peter is rich or Peter is stupid (or Peter is both 
rich and stupid). 
Peter is rich. 
Then would this be true: 
Peter is stupid? 
15. Suppose you know 
Either the gate is open or the gate is green (or the gate 
is both open and· green). 
The gate is not open. 
Then would this be true: 
The gate is green? 
16. Suppose you know 
Either the dog is black or the dog is dirty (or the dog is 
both black and dirty). 
The dog is not dirty. 
Then would this be true: 


























17. Suppose you know 
Either the car is small or the car is blue (or the car is 
both small and blue). 
The car is small. 
Then would this be 'true: 
The car is blue? 
18. Suppose you know 
Either John is intelligent or John is rich (or John is 
both intelligent and rich). 
John is not intelligent. 
Then would.this be true; 
John is rich? 
19. Suppose you know 
Either the door is closed or the door is white (or the 
door is both closed and white). 
The door is white. 
Then would this be true: 
The door is closed? 
20. Suppose you know 
Either the shed is ol.d or the shed is grey (or the shed 
is both old and grey). 
The shed is old. 
Then would this be true: 
The shed is grey? 
21. Suppose you know 
Either Peter is lazy or Peter is sick (or Peter is both 
lazy and sick) . 
Peter is not.sick. 
Then would this be true: 
Peter is lazy? 
22. Suppose you know 
Either the cat is hungry or the cat is.sick (or the cat 
is both hungry and sick). 
The cat is sick. 
Then would this be true: 
The cat is hungry? 
23. suppose you know 
Either the house is old or the house is white (or the 
house is both old and white). 
The house is not old: 
Then would this be true: 
The house is white? 
24. Suppose you know 
Either John is fat .or John is short (or John is both fat 
and short). 
John is short. 
Then would this be true:· 




























I. YOU CAN CHOOSE YES, NO, MAYBE 
where 
"YES" means "THE ANSWER MUST BE TRUE", 
11 N0 11 means "THE ANSWER CANNOT BE TRUE", and 
11 MAYBE" means 11 THE ANSWER MAY BE·TRUE OR MAY NOT BE TRUE. 
YOU WERE NOT.TOLD ENOUGH TO BE CERTAIN WHETHER 
THE ANSWER IS 'YES' OR 'N0'. 11 
EXAMPLE ONE 
SUPPOSE YOU KNOW 
IF THE CIRCLE IS RED, THEN THE SQUARE IS BLUE. 
THE CIRCLE IS RED. 
THEN WOULD THIS. BE TRUE: 
THE SQUARE IS BLUE? 
The answer in this example is YES for if the circle is 
red, than the square is blue. 
EXAMPLE TWO 
SUPPOSE YOU KNOW 
EITHER THE CIRCLE IS GREEN OR THE SQUARE IS GREEN 
(OR BOTH THE CIRCLE AND THE SQUARE ARE G"REEN). 
THE CIRCLE IS GREEN. 
THEN WOULD THIS BE TRUE: 
THE SQUAR~ IS GREEN? 
The answer in this example is .MAYBE for given the circle 




I I YES 
D NO 
I ✓I MAYBE 
1. Suppose you know 
If the circle is red, then the triangle is blue. 
The circle is red. 
Then would this be true: 
The triangle is blue? 
2. Suppose you know 
If the circle is blue, then the square is red. 
The square is red. 
Then would this be.true: 
The circle is blue? 
3, Suppose you know 
If the. square is blue, then the triangle is green. 
The triangle is not green. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is blue? 
4. Suppose you know 
If the square is green, then the triangle is red. 
The square is not green. 
Then would this be true: 
The triangle is not red? 
5. Suppose you know 
If the circle is red, then the triangle is green. 
The triangle is green. 
Then would this be true: 
The circle is red? 
6. Suppose you know 
If the square is green, then the. circle is blue. 
The square· ·is green. 
Then would this be true: 
The circle is blue? 
7. Suppose you know 
If the circle is red, then the square is blue. 
The circle is not red. 
rhen would this be true: 
The square is not blue? 
8. Suppose you know 
If the circle is red, then the square is green. 
The square is not green. 
Then woulo this be true: 


























9. Suppose you know 
If the triangle is green, then the square is red. 
The triangle is not green. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is not red? 
10. Suppose you know 
If the triangle is blue, then the square is red. 
The triangle is blue. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is red? 
11. Suppose you know 
If the square is blue, then the triangle is red. 
The triangle is not red. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is blue? 
12. Suppose you know 
If the square is green, then the triangle is blue. 
The triangle is blue. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is green? 
13. Suppose you know 
Either the square is red or the circle is red (or both 
the square and the circle are red) 
The circle is not red. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is red? 
14. Suppose you know 
Either the circle is green or the triangle is green (or 
both the circle and the triangle are green). 
The circle is green. 
Then would this be true: 
The triangle is green? 
15. Suppose you know 
Either the square is red or the triangle is red (or both 
the square and the triangle are red). 
The square is not red. 
Then would this be true: 
The triangle is red? 
16. Suppose you know 
Either the square is green or the triangle is green (or 
both the square and the triangle are green). 
The triangle is not green. 
Then would this be true: 


























17. Suppose you know 
Either the square is blue or the circle is blue (or both 
the square and the circle are blue). 
The square is blue. 
Then would this be true: 
The circle is blue? 
18. Suppose you know 
Either the circle is green or the square is green (or both 
the circle and the square are green). 
The circle is not green. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is green? 
19. Suppose you know 
Either the triangle is red or the square is red (or both 
the triangle and the square are red). 
The square is red. 
Then would this be true: 
The triangle is red? 
20. Suppose you know 
Either the triangle is red or the circle is red (or both 
the triangle and the circle are red). 
The triangle is red. 
Then would this be true: 
The circle is red? 
21. Suppose you know 
Either the square is blue or the circle is blue (or both 
the square and the circle are blue). 
The circle is not blue. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is blue? 
2 2. Suppose y·ou kno\•l 
Either the triangle is green or the circle is green (or 
both the triangle and the circle are green). 
The circle is green. 
Then would this be true: 
The triangle is green? 
23. Suppose you know 
Either the circle is blue or the square is blue (or both 
the circle and the square are blue). 
The circle is not blue. 
Then would this be true: 
The square is blue? 
24. Suppose you know 
Either the square is red or the circle is red (or both 
the square and the circle are red). 
The circle is red. 
Then would this be true: 



























GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS USED 
IN THE REASONING TEST 
74 
The following instructions were read out to the 
students prior to testi~g. 
75 
"Turn to the front page of the booklet; these are 
examples to help you in answering the questions later. I 
will go through these examples, and if you are not clear 
about any of them, please ask. 
In the box at the top of the first page, is written: 
'You can choose Yes, No, Maybe, where 
'Yes' means 'The answer must be true', 
'No' means 'The answer cannot be true', and 
'Maybe' means 'The answer may be true or may not be true. 
You were not told enough to be certain whether the answer 
is "Yes" or "No".' 
EXAMPLE ONE 
Suppose you know 
If the coat is brown, then it belongs to Mr Smith. 
The coat is brown 
Then would this be true·: 
The coat belongs to Mr Smith? 
The answer in this example is Yes for if the coat is brown, 
then it belongs to Mr Smith. 
EXAMPLE TWO 
Suppose you know 
If the coat is brown, then it belongs to Mr Smith. 
The coat belongs to Mr Smith. 
Then would this be true: 
The coat ·is brown? 
76 
The answer in this example is Maybe for the coat belonging 
to Mr Smith might not hecessarily be brown. 
EXAMPLE THREE 
Suppose you know 
Either Don is tall or Don is thin (or Don is both tall 
and thin) 
Don is not tall. 
Then would this be true: 
Don is thin? 
The answer in this example is Yes for given that Don is not 
tall, then he must be thin. 
In answering these questions, you have to consider all 
the possibilities. Remember, 
'Yes' means 'The answer must be true' 
'No' means 'The answer cannot be true', and 
'Maybe' means 'The answer may be true or may not be true. 
You were not told enough to be certain whether the answer 
is "Yes" or "No".' 
There are two p~r~g ~n thP tests, Part 1 and Part 2. 
After you have finished with Part 1, read through the 
examples of Part 2 before proceeding with the following 
questions. Are there any questions? 
Before you start, please write down your dates of 
birth and your sexes." 
